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ABSTRACT
The leading school reform policy in the United States revolves around strong accountability of
schools with consequences for performance. The federal government's involvement through the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 reinforces the prior movement of many states toward policies based
on measured student achievement. Analysis of state achievement growth as measured by the
National Assessment of Educational progress shows that accountability systems introduced during
the 1990s had a clear positive impact on student achievement. This single policy instrument did not,
however, also lead to any narrowing in the black-white achievement gap (though it did narrow the
Hispanic-white achievement gap). Moreover, the black-white gap appears to have been harmed over
the decade by increasing minority concentrations in the schools. An additional issue surrounding
stronger accountability has been a concern about unintended consequences related to such things
as higher exclusion rates from testing, increased drop-out rates, and the like. Our analysis of special
education placement rates, a frequently identified area of concern, does not show any responsiveness













  The cornerstone of Federal educational policy has been expansion of school 
accountability based on measured student test performance.  While many states had already 
installed accountability systems by 2000, a central campaign theme of George W. Bush was to 
expand this to all states, something that became a reality with the No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001 (NCLB).  The policy has been controversial for a variety of reasons, leading to assertions 
that it has distorted schools in undesirable ways, that is has led to gaming and unintended 
consequences, and that it has not even accomplished its objectives of improving student 
achievement.  This paper provides evidence on the expected effects of NCLB not only on student 
performance but also on other potential consequences. 
The landmark NCLB codified a developing policy view that standards, testing, and 
accountability were the path to improved performance.  It is nonetheless not possible to 
investigate the impact of NCLB directly.  First, and most importantly, the majority of states had 
already instituted some sort of accountability system by the time the federal law took effect.  
While only 12 states had accountability systems at the school level in 1996, 39 states did so by 
2000.  Thus, there is no ready comparison group that can indicate what might have happened 
without any law.  Second, the law has many facets but there is no obvious way to identify and 
measure the different components that are coming into play at a common pace across the states.   
  Isolating the impact of state accountability policies is inherently difficult.  Because 
accountability invariably applies to entire states at an instant in time, variation across schools 
within a state provides no information about the impacts of accountability, and it is necessary to 
rely on state-level variation in student outcomes.  Yet, states differ not only in their accountability 
policies but also in a variety other ways involving both population characteristics and other 
school policies.  If these are not accounted for, they are likely to contaminate the estimates of the 
states’ accountability system.   2
  Our approach uses information about state differences in mathematics and reading 
performance as identified by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).  We 
pursue a number of strategies designed to isolate the effects of school accountability on 
performance.  First, we look at growth in performance between 4
th and 8
th grades to eliminate 
fixed differences in circumstances and policies of each state.  Second, we include explicit 
measures for major categories of time varying inputs:  parental education, school spending, and 
racial exposure in the schools.  Third, we estimate the growth models with state fixed effects to 
eliminate any other policies that lead to trends up or down in student performance in each state.  
Finally, to identify differences by race or ethnicity, we disaggregate the state results for whites, 
blacks, and Hispanics.   
  We find that the introduction of accountability systems into a state tends to lead to larger 
achievement growth than would have occurred without accountability.  The analysis, however, 
indicates that just reporting results has minimal impact on student performance and that the force 
of accountability comes from attaching consequences to school performance.  This finding 
supports the contested provisions of NCLB that impose sanctions on failing schools.    
  Much of the explicit interest in accountability and the federal legislation, however, 
focuses on low achievers.  And, given the generally lower achievement by minority groups, an 
implicit assumption is that accountability – as revealed through mandatory disaggregation of 
performance for racial and ethnic groups – will simultaneously close the large achievement 
racial/ethnic gaps along with improving all performance.  When we look specifically at the 
performance of subgroups, we find that Hispanic students gain most from accountability while 
blacks gain least.  
  Since the widespread introduction of accountability, a parallel interest has been whether 
more rigorous and consequential accountability also leads to other, less desirable impacts.  For 
example, does accountability lead to increased cheating, more classifications of students as 
special education, or undesirable narrowing of teaching?  To address a subset of these issues, we   3
analyze the rate of placement into special education across states but find no evidence of reaction 
in this dimension.  
  The next section briefly highlights the various lines of research that motivate the 
approach to estimating the determinants of state differences in achievement.  This is followed by 
a more formal development of the statistical specification and by a description of the primary data 
employed.  Two section then report the results of accountability systems on achievement growth 
and on special education placement. 
Relevant Strands of Literature 
  Any consideration of state accountability systems must recognize the multitude of 
potential influences on student outcomes.  The secret is separating the influence of accountability 
from these other factors.   
  The vast production function literature on variations in student performance provides a 
general backdrop for the analysis of achievement.  This literature, dating from the Coleman 
Report (Coleman (1966)) and still being developed today, suggests significant differences in 
student achievement based on both family background and on schools (Hanushek (2002)).
1 A 
variety of controversies exists, particularly about the impact of various school resources (see 
Hanushek (2003)), but without going into detail about these it is sufficient to conclude that there 
is a lack of consensus about any specific measures of schools that adequately capture the relevant 
factors determining student performance.  Some similar ambiguities exist when considering the 
measurement of family influences, even if there is strong consensus that families are very 
important in determining achievement.  This lack of consensus on the appropriate specification of 
the determinants of student achievement motivates the analytical approach described below. 
                                                 
1 Much of this literature is reviewed elsewhere. Here we simply identify sources both of basic analysis and 
of extended bibliographies on the relevant issues.   4
  Throughout the study of schools and achievement, considerable attention has gone to the 
distribution of outcomes, and especially racial aspects of schooling.  As famously highlighted 
more than 50 years ago by Brown v. Board of Education, the racial composition of schools may 
be relevant to achievement. The Coleman Report itself was legislatively mandated in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and spawned attention to the racial composition of schools (U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights (1967)).  While most of the subsequent analysis flowing from Brown has related 
directly to the desegregation of schools (e.g., Armor (1995), Rossell, Armor, and Walberg 
(2002)), recent attention has turned more to issues related to the composition of schools.   
  Separating the effects of the racial composition of schools from other factors is clearly 
difficult, in large part because measurement errors for other school and family factors are likely to 
be correlated with racial composition.  The analysis of Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) 
approaches this through a generalized peer analysis that controls for family, school, and 
neighborhood effects through exploiting the rich longitudinal data from stacked panel data on 
student performance in Texas.  That analysis suggests that increased black concentration of 
schools has a detrimental effect on black achievement, although racial composition does not seem 
to affect either whites or Hispanics.  This consideration is particularly important given recent 
concern that racial concentration in the schools has been rising.  Partly because court supervision 
over school racial patterns is ending but more importantly because white attendance in large 
urban systems has decreased, minority concentration has grown throughout the 1990s (Orfield 
and Eaton (1996), Clotfelter (2004)). 
  Each of these influences is embedded within school systems across the states that are 
pursuing a variety of policy reforms.  The difficulty is that these other reforms are neither well 
specified nor readily measured, leading to considerable difficulty in adequately differentiating the 
relevant components (Hanushek (2002)).  Moreover, as we look forward to an analysis of state 
level data, we know the potential damage of missing key ingredients to performances is amplified 
with aggregate data (Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996)).   5
  The final strand of relevant literature pertains to accountability itself.  Although a recent 
policy effort, policies related to accountability have already become quite controversial – rising to 
the level of front page stories in the New York Times  (Winter (2002)),   Much of the work is very 
new and has not appeared journals yet.  The available studies generally support the view that 
accountability has had a positive effect on student outcomes, although the limited observations 
introduce some uncertainty (Carnoy and Loeb (2002); Hanushek and Raymond (2003b); Jacob 
(2003); Peterson and West (2003)).
2   
  A larger body of work has concentrated on whether or not accountability has produced 
gaming and subsequent unintended consequences.  This available work, reviewed in Hanushek 
and Raymond (2003b), tends to suggest some immediate reactions to accountability in terms of 
focusing teaching on relevant subjects or even relevant students near performance cutoffs; of 
increased exclusions from tests; of explicit cheating on tests; and of like attempts to improve 
scores in ways other than improving student learning.  Nonetheless, as we return to below, little 
analysis provides information on the longer run outcomes of this nature. 
Strategies for Dealing with the Analytical Difficulties  
  Analyzing the effects of accountability on student performance is difficult.  Because 
accountability systems are introduced across entire states, all local school districts in a state face a 
common incentive structure.  Thus, the only possible variation comes from interstate differences 
in accountability, but, as noted above, states also differ in ways other than accountability and 
ways in which past research has not been very informative.  The difficulty is that, with little 
progress having been made in describing explicitly the different policies, regulations, and 
incentives that might be important in determining student performance, statistical estimates of 
accountability will been to be biased.   
                                                 
2 Some variation also comes from analytical methods; see Amrein and Berliner (2002) and the analysis in 
Raymond and Hanushek (2003).   6
  Fundamental educational policy is made at the state level and involves a wide range of 
factors including financial structure, collective bargaining rules and laws, explicit regulations on 
educational processes, curricular specification, and so forth.  The analytical complications are 
immediately apparent. 
  Consider a simple model of achievement such as: 
(1)  Of X R st st st s = (,, ) ρ  
where O is the level of student outcomes in state s at time t, X is a vector of family and nonschool 
inputs, R is a vector of school resources, and ρ captures the policies of the state.
3  It is not 
possible to understand the impact of newly introduced accountability systems without considering 
the range of other factors influencing achievement.   
  A linearized version of this model is simply: 
(2)  OX R st X st R st s st =+ + + + β β β ρ ε 0 ()  
where the β’s are unknown parameters of the educational process.
4  If, however, ρ is not observed 
and the β’s are estimated with just information on X and R, correlations with ρ obviously lead to 
bias in the estimation.  When background factors (X) and/or school resources (R) are correlated 
with state policies (ρ), these variables will partially proxy for the other policies – leading to 
incorrect inferences about what would happen if just X or R changed. 
  Now consider just adding A, a measure of whether or not accountability affects 
incentives and thus student performance.   
(3)  0 () st X st R st st s st OX R A β ββ γ ρ ε =+ + + + +  
                                                 
3 It does not matter for this discussion that we begin with aggregate outcomes for a state instead of building 
up from the individual student level (where the outcomes are presumably generated).  The more general 
situation is discussed and developed in Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996).  Where the aggregation is 
important, we discuss the implications. 
4 The linear form is not particularly crucial but simply makes the exposition easier.  An alternative model 
where policies act as an efficiency parameter affecting the impact of resources is developed in Hanushek 
and Somers (2001).  Within the limited data for this study, however, it is virtually impossible to distinguish 
between the alternative models.  The results of estimating the alternative form, discussed below, are 
qualitatively very close to the included estimates.   7
The objective is to understand γ, but under almost all circumstances γ will also be biased by 
omission of relevant other state policies, through either their direct correlation with accountability 
or with the other inputs into achievement. 
  Moreover, Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996) demonstrate that the bias in any 
estimation will generally increase with the level of aggregation in situations like this.  
Specifically, when the omitted variable is relevant at the state level, estimation of the model 
across states will have the most bias.  Note that this does not say anything about the direction of 
any bias, only that aggregation worsens the bias.  In the case of measures of school resources, all 
evidence indicates that there is an upward bias from omitting state policies (Hanushek (2003; 
Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996)).  It does not, however, give much indication of how any 
estimation of partial models of accountability would bias analyses of γ. 
  If, however, the relevant state policies other than accountability are constant over our 
observation period, a variety of estimation approaches becomes possible.  In the simplest form, 
simply looking at outcome changes over time eliminates any state differences that are constant 
over the period t to t*: 
(4) 
,* s Xs R s s s tt
OXR A β βγε ∆=∆ +∆ + ∆ + ∆   
The key element is that effects of accountability systems are identified from changes in 
accountability across states over the sample period.  Specifically, if all states introduced new 
accountability systems at the same time, ∆A would be constant, and γ would not be separately 
identified.  This estimation relies on the variation in introduction of accountability systems over 
the period during which student achievement gains are observed. 
  But states do a variety of things to try to improve their schools – not just relying on 
accountability (or the absence of accountability).  In order to allow for other policies that are 
occurring over time, we add a state fixed effect (  s δ ) to the estimation as in equation 5:     8
(5) 
,* s Xs R s ss s tt
OXR A β βγ δ ε ∆=∆ +∆ + ∆ + + ∆  
Such a model can be estimated when there are multiple observations of achievement growth for 
each state.  With multiple observations for states, achievement growth during periods of 
accountability can be contrasted with achievement growth when the state had no accountability. 
  This formulation provides much better control for other factors influencing performance 
growth, because the formulation effectively adds a trend in performance that is relevant for each 
state.  The growth formulation itself incorporates any state differences in policies, student and 
family characteristics, or other things that exert a constant influence on states performance over 
the relevant observation period.  Adding the state fixed effect to this permits states to have 
policies that lead to trend differences in their student performance.  (And, of course, the other 
policies of each state may or may not be effective in raising achievement, and no presumption is 
made about how they influence achievement).  Now estimates of the effects of accountability are 
identified and estimated entirely on the basis of the introduction of accountability systems within 
each state.  In essence, the estimation relies on a state-specific prediction of performance gains 
and then considers how the addition of an accountability system affects outcomes. 
  One final issue is relevant for the estimation.  The objective is to generalize about what 
would happen when accountability is introduced to all states.  But, the analysis relies on observed 
student performance data, and the sample of students may not be representative of the entire 
population.   
A school can respond to disappointing assessments in two ways.  First, it can adjust 
teachers, curriculum, and programs in an attempt to improve the teaching that occurs.  This is, 
however, a difficult long-run proposition, made even more difficult in schools with high rates of 
staff turnover.  A second, shorter-run strategy may result: to become more selective about the 
student scores that are incorporated into the school scores.  The second approach could   9
supplement or possibly replace the first.  By weeding out students who are poor performers, the 
school score can appear to be improving even if nothing different is being done.   
  The formal version of this, selection bias through testing rules, can be considered simply 
by looking in more detail at equation 5.  The estimation of the effects of accountability (γ) 
depends on ∆A being uncorrelated with ∆ε.  If in fact states purposefully select who will take the 
tests that enter into the performance calculation, this condition will be violated.   
  The main issue, which we explicitly consider below, is that individual states have some 
control over the exclusion of students for reason of language or special education.  Two 
approaches are suggested.  First, in the spirit of Heckman (1979), one can simply estimate: 
(6) 
,*
() s Xs R s s s s tt
OXR A p t β βγ δ ε ∆=∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆+ + ∆  
where ∆p(t) is the observed change in probability of taking the test over the observation period.
5   
  Second, it is possible to estimate directly the exclusion probabilities: 
(7)  p(t) f(X,R,A) =  
This second approach, which we follow in a secondary analysis, provides direct information 
about the unintended consequences of accountability systems. 
  Our estimation of the direct effects of accountability relies on variants of Equation 6.  
The essential question throughout is whether the introduction of accountability into a state alters 
the achievement that would be expected due to parents, school characteristics, and other policies 
that have also been put in place.  Below we return to the estimation of whether accountability also 
leads to changes in the tested population in addition to any potential impacts on student 
performance. 
                                                 
5 Note that, if the probability of exclusion from the testing is constant, this term will drop out from the 
growth calculations.  Only changes in test taking rates will be relevant.   10
Data on State Accountability 
  The primary assessment of student performance for our analysis is the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress.  This testing, often referred to as the “Nation’s report card,” 
provides a consistent measure of student performance that allows comparisons of students across 
time and across states.  The focus throughout the NAEP testing (which began in 1969) has been 
developing assessment information for a representative sample of students at different age and 
grade levels. 
  The estimation of accountability effects uses two elements of the NAEP testing 
information.  First, since the introduction of state level testing in 1990, NAEP has tracked 
performance over time for participating states.  This testing provides directly useful data for two 
tests (mathematics and reading).  The sampling/testing design of NAEP is particularly helpful 
because it has a basic four- year testing cycle that involves testing fourth and eighth graders.  
Thus, for example, fourth grade tests in math in 1992 can be paired with eighth grade math tests 
in 1996.  While not the same students, this approach allows tracking the same cohort in each 
state, and thus holds constant common experiences for the cohort.  Two cohort observations for 
math growth (1992-96 and 1996-2000) and two for reading growth (1994-98 and 1998-2002) 
makes is possible to create a panel of achievement growth in each subject – thus permitting 
estimation that removes individual state fixed effects.
6 
  Second, throughout this analysis we also disaggregate by race and ethnicity.  The 
consistent performance data separated by whites, blacks, and Hispanics permits a direct 
investigation of relative performance gains.  Note, however, that the availability of disaggregated 
data for blacks or Hispanics within a state depends upon having a sufficiently large population to 
                                                 
6 Note that the analysis relies on state aggregates and not individual level scores.  While NAEP provides 
some disaggregated data, the testing scheme does not permit analysis of individual level performance.  
Pooling the data presumes that other state factors equally affect growth in both math and reading.   11
support separate reporting of test information.  Thus, there are fewer state observations of black 
and Hispanic achievement than of white achievement.  
  The sample of student performance for the estimation thus depends both on the 
availability of disaggregated achievement data and on participation of the state in testing during 
both of the relevant testing years (e.g., 8
th grade math testing in 1996 and 4
th grade math testing in 
1992).  The relevant testing and racial/ethnic breakdowns for each of the sample periods for the 
separate tests is shown in Appendix Table A1.  A total of 348 observations of state gains on the 
tests is available.
7  This sample is somewhat more heavily weighted toward whites, with fewer 
black observations and even fewer Hispanic observations.  Note, however, that there are more 
distinct states (42) than appear for any of the time period-test breakdowns; a varying group of 
states participates in each of the tested grades and subjects for the different years. 
  Measured attributes of state education inputs include three primary factors:  
demographics, school resources, and school racial and ethnic composition.  The key demographic 
factor is the education of the adult population.  While we have various measures of the education 
distribution, we concentrate on the percentage of the population 25 years old or more that has at 
least a high school education.  We calculate this separately for each population subgroup and for 
the relevant years of testing.
8  Not surprisingly, there are significant differences in average 
attainment for each of the groups:  whites, 82 percent; blacks, 74 percent; and Hispanics, 60 
percent. Substantial differences in these aggregate patterns also arise across states. 
  School resources are measured by the average state expenditure per pupil in real terms 
over the relevant time period.  This measure cumulates the spending over the growth period being 
studied (i.e., each relevant four year period on which achievement growth is defined) and varies 
by state and time but not by subgroup.   
                                                 
7 Because of missing data on exclusions from testing, the analytical samples are reduced to 348 
observations from the 351 state observations with matched 4
th and 8
th testing for specific cohorts. 
8 The analysis interpolates data from the decennial censuses in 1990 and 2000 for each state and race/ethnic 
group to get the appropriate annual data for each state.  We use the percentage of high school or more 
adults at the midpoint for each testing period.   12
  To investigate the impact of racial concentration and trends over time, we include 
summary data on the racial and ethnic composition across the schools in each state.  Specifically, 
for whites, blacks, and Hispanics, we calculate exposure to minority students in each school of 
the state (using the Common Core of Data of the U.S. Department of Education).  The exposure 
measure indicates the proportion of school mates who are minority for the average white, black, 
and Hispanic student in the state in each year.  These exposure rates are again averaged over the 
relevant test growth periods.  The pattern of concentration of minorities by school yields disparate 
results for the amount of minority exposure for each group.  Whites attended schools that on 
average over the period have 16 percent minority students, while the comparable percentages for 
blacks and Hispanics are 48 and 38 percent, respectively.  
  Data on accountability come from a survey and analysis of all states by CREDO (Fletcher 
and Raymond (2002)).  For each state, information was collected on when a state introduced an 
accountability system for schools.  For these purposes, an accountability system was defined as 
publishing outcome information on standardized tests for each school along with providing a way 
to aggregate and interpret the school performance.
9  States were classified by whether or not they 
attached consequences to school performance or simply provided a public report.  Additionally, 
data were also collected on when a state began disaggregating test information by subgroups of 
the population.  Note that these accountability measures pertain just to accountability for schools 
and do not mix in accountability for students that may have been introduced at a different time.
10   
  The estimation relies on the varying timing of introduction of accountability systems into 
the different states.  Figure 1 displays the overall cumulative pattern of accountability across the 
states.  The data are broken up into states that attach consequences to their systems and states that 
simply report on school achievement.  To understand the estimation strategy better, the set of 
                                                 
9 The survey further collected information on the method by which schools aggregated scores.  The 
alternative approaches are discussed in Hanushek and Raymond (2003b). 
10 Carnoy and Loeb (2002) employ an index of intensity of accountability that covers both school and 
student accountability measures but do not consider differential times of introduction.  
 
 
Figure 1. State Accountability over Time
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NAEP testing dates for 8
th grade math and reading performance is superimposed on the pattern of 
accountability.  The varied introduction across time and across the different testing periods 
permits disentangling the impact of accountability.   
  Finally, while the NAEP testing provides a consistent sample of performance for the 
states, some variations might arise simply because of differences in the test taking procedures in 
the states.  Specifically, over the period a variety of students could be excluded from the testing 
because of special conditions including most importantly being identified as either a special 
education or Limited English Proficient student.  The common presumption is that, since these 
students usually fall near the bottom of the achievement distribution, excluding them will 
artificially raise average scores of the tested population.  Fortunately, NAEP provides information 
on test exclusions by test and year.  Over the relevant time period, special education placements 
rose for the nation as a whole and for the separate states – going from 11.4 percent in 1990 to 
13.3 percent in 2001.  Over that same time period, test exclusions also rose, but by amounts that 
exceed the overall growth in the special education population.  The pattern, however, differs 
dramatically by state with some states actually reducing the NAEP exclusion rate while others 
saw very large increases.  These data on NAEP exclusions permit us to adjust for whether 
exclusion rates increased or decreased across separate testing periods in each state (which we do 
in a regression framework).   
State Accountability and Student Achievement  
  We begin with the overall effect of state accountability on NAEP performance in the 8
th 
grade across the three race/ethnic groups:  whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  The basic estimation 
pools the different time periods and tests but includes indicator variables for time period and test.  
The regression estimates predict 8
th grade performance based on 4
th grade performance of 
students in the state four years prior.  Table 1 provides a summary of the key results for the 





Table 1.  Determinants of State Growth in NAEP Performance (4
th to 
8
th Grade)    
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Consequential accountability 3.324  3.349 3.433 
 
 
      (2.64)***       (2.66)***       (2.74)*** 
Report card system   0.734  0.633  0.760 
 
 
 (0.44)   (0.38)   (0.46) 
%pop(age 25+)≥high  school  0.075 0.040 0.030 
 
 
 (1.70)*   (0.81)  (0.60) 
School spending, $/ADM  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
 
 
(0.53) (0.39) (0.43) 
Change in exclusion rates   0.525  0.528  0.522 
 
 
    (3.98)***     (4.01)***     (3.98)*** 
Black   -10.815  -10.137  -7.362 
 
 
     (7.82)***       (7.02)***       (3.80)*** 
Hispanic   -9.707  -9.934  -10.062 
 
 
     (6.92)***       (7.06)***       (6.53)*** 
Minority exposure rate     -4.875   
 
 
 (1.59)  
Minority exposure x white      1.783 
 
 
   (0.35) 
Minority exposure x  Hispanic      -3.278 
 
 
   (0.98) 
Minority exposure x black      -8.468 
          (2.35)** 
     
Observations  348 348 348 
Number  of  states  42 42 42 
R-squared 0.94  0.94  0.94 
    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
   
 
Notes:  All models estimated with state fixed effects.  Models include NAEP 4
th grade scores for reading 
and for math (lagged four years) and indicator variables for test and period.  Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses 
   14
variable definitions along with descriptive statistics are found in Appendix Table A2).  All 
estimates include individual state fixed effects, but the results remain qualitatively the same if 
simply estimated with random effect models across the states. 
  The accountability measure indicates the share of  the period of study when a state had 
accountability (i.e., it ranges from 0.25 for accountability being in place for one year of the 
growth period for performance to 1.0 for accountability being in place for all four years.  The data 
collection was designed to measure when the accountability system became effective, not when it 
was legislatively passed (Fletcher and Raymond (2002)).
11   
   From Table 1 we find consistent evidence that introduction of state accountability had a 
positive impact on student math performance during the 1990s.  Specifically, states that 
introduced consequential accountability systems early, tended to show more rapid gains in NAEP 
performance, holding other inputs and policies constant.  This is consistent with our prior 
estimates of the effects of accountability for aggregations of all students in each state (Hanushek 
and Raymond (2003a, (2003b)).
12 
  Interestingly, we find that report cards do not have a significant influence on 
performance.  The point estimates, while positive, are not significantly different from zero.  Thus, 
it seems important that policies include direct incentives rather than rely on indirect forces 
operating through just information. 
   The large differences in spending per pupil never influence scores.  Consistent with past 
evidence on the impacts of resources (Hanushek (2003)), the pattern of NAEP scores across states 
                                                 
11 Nonetheless, potential state-to-state differences in the phase in of accountability systems could 
effectively introduce measurement error into the accountability variable.  An alternative approach is simply 
to measure whether or not the accountability system was in effective during the period, i.e., taking on the 
values 0 or 1.  Pursuing this estimation yields qualitatively similar results, although a variety of the effects 
are not as precisely estimated (Hanushek and Raymond (2004)). 
12 The prior aggregate estimates, however, did not find a statistically different impact of report card systems 
versus consequential systems.  In the estimates here, equality of consequences and reporting is rejected at 
the 10 percent level or better.    15
is not explained by spending.  The impact of aggregate state spending is consistently small and 
statistically insignificant.   
  Test exclusions always have the expected effect on tests:  more exclusions from a test for 
special education or language increase the average growth in test score.  The introduction of 
exclusions, however, does not impact the estimates of accountability – chiefly because the 
introduction of accountability was not associated with large increases in exclusions.  In fact, when 
states introduce accountability measures, they tend simultaneously to reduce on average their 
exclusion rates by a small amount. 
  In terms of general effects, the simplest model (column 1) indicates that higher parental 
education positively (and significantly at the 10 percent level) affects scores.  However, as we 
refine the estimates in the more detailed specifications, any effects of parental education are 
imprecisely estimated and the effects are insignificant.   
  The remainder of Table 1 concentrates on the basic differences in performance by race.     
With disaggregation of performance by race (compared to aggregate state effects presented in 
Hanushek and Raymond (2003a, (2003b)), we see distinct differences in gains by blacks and 
Hispanics.  These subgroups show growth that is 6-10 points lower than whites on NAEP 
between 4
th and 8
th grade. This spread overshadows the 3.5 point gain that came with 
accountability.  This finding of lower black and Hispanic growth is particularly interesting in 
light of the narrowing of the achievement gap that occurred in the 1980s and the subsequent 
explanations for this improvement (Jencks and Phillips (1998)).  The analysis of state details here 
that controls for state policy, family backgrounds, and testing exclusions shows a clear reversal of 
the prior decade.    16
  The separate columns of Table 1 relate directly to the other major policy movement that 
had potential racial aspects:  the influence of changing concentrations of minorities.
13  In these, 
we introduce measures of exposure rates of white, Hispanics, and blacks to minorities (Hispanics 
and blacks) across the schools in each state.
14  Total minority concentration has a negative but 
statistically insignificant impact in column 2.  But the story changes when the impact of minority 
concentration is permitted to vary by subgroup in column 3, instead of being constrained to have 
the same effect.  Higher minority concentrations have a statistically significant negative impact 
on blacks but do not significantly affect either whites or Hispanics.  This finding is generally 
consistent with the analysis of racial composition in Texas by Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 
(2002).  In that work, blacks were quite sensitive to school composition – specifically the 
proportion of blacks in the school negatively affected blacks, but whites and Hispanics were 
unaffected by student body composition.   
To test the effect of intra-race influences, a further refinement of these models (not 
shown) considered black exposures to blacks instead of to minorities (blacks plus Hispanics).  It 
is very difficult within these data to distinguish between the two alternative specifications.  Using 
black exposure for blacks produced slight less precise estimates (t=2.0) but did not alter the other 
conclusions.   
    The models discussed so far (and represented in Table 1) consider the effects of 
accountability to be equivalent across the separate groups.  For a variety of reasons, the effects 
may not be uniform.  Thus, we estimate the same basic models but permit the effects of 
accountability to differ by race and ethnicity.  Table 2 presents the results for these models.  The 
first column is directly comparable to the previous table, but it now indicates distinct differences 
                                                 
13 Earlier discussion of the lack of progress in closing the black-white gap in the 1990s speculated that 
changing patterns in school composition due to school desegregation patterns influenced the aggregate  
time series pattern of scores (Hanushek (2001)). 
14 These exposure  rates are calculated on an individual school basis within each state.  The variable for 
minority exposure in column 2 calculates exposure relative to each subgroup in the pooled sample; i.e., the 
variable is the exposure of white students to minorities for the white subset of the sample and the exposure 
of blacks to minorities for the black subset.  
 
Table 2.  Determinants of State Growth in NAEP Performance (4
th to 
8
th Grade) with Disaggregation by Race and Ethnicity  
 
 (1)  (2) 
Consequential Accountability  3.446  3.590 
 
 
   (2.53)***     (2.81)*** 
Report card system   0.827  0.820 
 
 
 ( 0.52)   (0.51) 
Consequential Accountability x Hispanic  3.084   
 
 
     (2.59)***   




Disaggregated x Hispanic    2.969 
 
 
    (2.46)** 
Disaggregated x black    -2.410 
 
 
     (2.21)** 








Change in exclusion rates   0.514  0.517 
 
 
      (4.03)***        (4.04)*** 
Black   -6.234  -6.670 
 
 
     (3.21)***       (3.50)*** 
Hispanic   -10.034  -9.694 
 
 
     (6.58)***       (6.40)*** 








Minority exposure x black  -8.169  -7.827 
      (2.32)**      (2.22)** 
    
Observations 348  348 
Number of states  42  42 
R-squared 0.90  0.90 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
  Notes:  All models estimated with state fixed effects.  Models include NAEP 4
th grade scores for reading 
and math (lagged four years) and indicator variables for test and period.  Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses   17
by subgroup.  Specifically, we see in column 1 that Hispanics seem significantly more affected 
than whites by having consequential accountability, while blacks appear less affected than whites.   
   When states introduce accountability systems they may or may not disaggregate the test 
results by racial group (as now required by NCLB).  In the second columns we look at the 
differential impact of accountability for systems with subgroup disaggregation.  When 
disaggregated accountability information is provided, Hispanics gain significantly and now show 
a greater reaction to accountability than whites.  On the other hand, blacks do significantly worse 
than both whites and Hispanics.  
In these more detailed models, we again find the strong indications that the racial 
composition of the schools is important for blacks.  With the substantial negative impact of 
increased minority exposure, blacks appear hurt when attending less integrated schools. 
  It is useful to understand the magnitudes of both the accountability effects and the racial 
differences.  Figure 2 displays the expected gains for states without consequential accountability 
and for states with consequential accountability.  These gains are based on the disaggregations in 
column 2 of Table 2.  As can be seen, the introduction of consequential accountability leads to 
improved growth in NAEP performance for each of the groups.  To put the gains in perspective, 
on average, the white improvement is 0.22 standard deviations.
15   
  At the same time, the subgroup patterns both in performance gains and in the impacts of 
accountability clearly differ.  The differences are most easily seen in Figure 3, which translates 
the data into the black-white and Hispanic-white gaps in NAEP performance gains.  The 
Hispanic-white gap in gains falls from 0.6 standard deviations to 0.42 standard deviations when 
consequential accountability (with disaggregated scores) is introduced in a state.  But, the black-
white gap in performance actually increases with accountability (from 0.43 to 0.57 standard 
deviations).     
                                                 
15 These calculations rely on the standard deviation of average scores across states and subgroups for the 
eighth grade performance, which equals 16.2 scale score points.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Effect of Consequential Accountability 

























Figure 3. Racial/Ethnic Gaps 
by Consequential Accountability Status 
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  Accountability systems thus lead to overall improvements in student performance on 
NAEP mathematics and reading tests, but they do not uniformly meet the objective of also 
closing achievement gaps.  This finding appears to be a simple demonstration of the well known 
principle that achieving multiple objectives with a single policy instrument is not generally 
feasible.  We return to this below. 
Other Consequences:  Special-Education Placement 
As many people have suggested, there is an immediate incentive in most existing 
accountability systems to exclude students who might be expected to have low achievement.  A 
method often discussed is to place students into special education and thereby exclude them from 
testing and from subsequent inclusion in the accountability system.  The previous analysis of the 
impact of accountability on achievement explicitly controlled for alterations in exclusions from 
NAEP testing, but the exclusion behavior is interesting in its own right.  
Several studies have investigated whether schools appear to react to accountability 
through exclusions.  Jacob (2002) considers the introduction of test-based accountability for 
Chicago public schools.  He finds that the large increases in test scores after accountability went 
into effect were also accompanied by increases in special education placement and by increased 
grade retentions. Deere and Strayer (2001a, (2001b) and Cullen and Reback (2002) also find 
apparent increases in special education placement with the introduction of accountability in 
Texas.   Prior work in Kentucky by  Koretz and Barron (1998) suggested no strategic use of grade 
retentions.  Haney (2000) suggests that both grade retention and increased dropouts were key to 
improvements in Texas tests, although both Carnoy, Loeb, and Smith (2001) and Toenjes and 
Dworkin (2002) seriously question this after reanalysis of the data.
16  Any grade retentions are, 
however, short run effects that do not provide lasting “accountability” value except if the 
                                                 
16 Carnoy, Loeb, and Smith (2001) also find that at least in larger urban areas lower dropout rates are 
associated with higher student achievement.   19
placement is educationally valuable.  Figlio and Getzler (2002) concentrate on special education 
placement after the introduction of a state accountability system in Florida.  The most persuasive 
evidence is that placement rates increase relatively over time in grades that enter into the 
accountability system as opposed to those grades that do not.   
In each case, the analysis considers changes that occur around the time of introduction of 
an accountability system.  In fact, the key element of most of this research is using the change in 
accountability to identify the effects on special education placement rates and the like through 
finding breaks in the patterns of prior placement.  Three things are important.  First, there is very 
little relevant data for these analyses – breaks in trends, perhaps compared to trends of other 
schools (such as schools outside of Chicago and its accountability system).  The validity of the 
interpretation depends crucially on whether or not other things are changing over time that could 
also affect the patterns of observed changes.  Second, since later periods are always compared 
with earlier periods, there is concern about the general trend in special education placement that 
has been going on for two decades.  Third, each of these analyses provides information just on the 
short run immediate effects.  Since the incentives change over time, it is important to understand 
what happens as these systems continue.
17  Because of the recentness of introduction of 
accountability systems, little is know about the long run dynamics. 
In order to test the importance of this incentive, we study the responsiveness of special-
education placement rates to the introduction of an accountability system.  We concentrate on the 
period 1995-2000, the period of large growth in state accountability systems as described in 
                                                 
17 Hanushek and Raymond (2003b) consider the incentives that are set up by the design of different 
accountability systems.  While the method of aggregating student performance and of judging change over 
time has an impact, the main conclusion is that incentives to exclude are generally largest in the first year 
of an accountability system and then decline if not reverse in subsequent years.  This change in incentives 
results from the fact that exclusions in one year are generally built into the base for the next year, so that 
exclusions in any year must be maintained in subsequent year or they will lead to potential reductions in 
scores.  Moreover, getting added gains from exclusions over time requires continual increases in the 
exclusion rates.   20
Figure 1.  As with the achievement analysis, our basic strategy is to relate special-education 
placement rates to accountability and other factors that might affect placement.   
For this analysis, we do not rely on the sample of states participating in NAEP but instead 
turn to annual information on all states.  (Note, however, that it is not possible to disaggregate 
these data by race and ethnicity, so we concentrate on overall state behavior).  The basic 
modeling considers special education placement rates across all 50 states plus the District of 
Columbia.  All estimation includes state-specific fixed effects.  The “standard approach,” that 
found in the existing literature, simply considers comparisons of placement rates before and after 
the introduction of accountability systems or how placement rates differ with time since the 
introduction of accountability systems.  (The difference between consequential and report card 
systems was never significant in the estimation, so the analysis relies entirely on the combination 
of the two).  The standard model is then compared with a simple analysis that allows for national 
time trends in placement rates. 
The standard approach results in Table 3 show that the introduction of an accountability 
or report-card system is associated with roughly 1.5 percentage point higher special-education 
placement rates in a state.  These estimates are essentially generalizations of difference-in-
difference estimators that allow for comparisons across all of the states.  The second column 
indicates that the reaction to accountability occurs over time, with a 1.1 percentage point higher 
placement rate with accountability or report cards, and with an increase of 0.4 percentage point 
increase each year that the system is in place.  Thus, the state estimates appear to confirm the 
estimates from individual states and districts. 
The final two columns that place special education placement into the national picture, 
however, show a markedly different picture.  The final columns introduce a time trend and its 
square to allow for the strong and ubiquitous increases in special-education placement.  Columns 
3 and 4 show that both the effect of having a consequential or report card system and the effect of  
 
Table 3.  Effect of Accountability on Special-Education Placement 
Rate, 1995 through 2000 
 
  Standard Approach  Allowance for Placement 
Trend 
Accountability or 






















Note:  Estimation employs a panel of special education placement rates for all states and the District of 
Columbia over the period 1995-2000.  Estimation includes a fixed effect for each state.  The t-statistics 
appear below each estimate. Time trend =1 in 1995; =2 in 1996; etc.  21
how long such a system has been in effect have an insignificant impact on placement rates (in 
terms of magnitude and of statistical significance) once the overall trends are considered. 
These estimates suggest caution in interpreting analyses of the gaming of accountability 
systems.  If such gaming were generally important, it should show up in the national data—but it 
does not.  Moreover, the national trends in special-education placement offer a ready explanation 
for the divergent results.  
  Some Conclusions 
  Considerable public attention has focused on school accountability.  While many states 
were pursuing their own versions of accountability, the discussion was elevated to new heights 
during the 2000 Presidential campaign when George W. Bush made school accountability a 
centerpiece of his domestic policy platform.  Indeed the first year of his presidency involved 
significant pressure on Congress to enact accountability legislation, which it did with the No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001.   
  NCLB mandated that all states introduce accountability systems that included annual 
testing of all students in grades 3-8 by 2006 and disaggregated data on student performance for all 
schools.  This complex law also considered the development of state performance goals along 
with a variety of sanctions if schools failed to meet those goals.   
  NCLB has yet to be fully implemented, thus precluding a direct analysis of it.
18  
Nonetheless, because NCLB calls for each state to design its own system and because most states 
have keyed off of their existing systems, the analysis here of the impacts of state systems enacted 
prior to NCLB provides information about what can be expected with full implementation. 
                                                 
18  Somewhat ironically, when implemented, NCLB essentially precludes analysis of further impacts of 
overall accountability systems, because it eliminates any comparison group of states without accountability 
systems.  Since, however, individual states will still follow their own locally developed schemes, it will still 
be possible to contrast the impacts of alternative types of accountability systems and alternative rewards 
and sanctions.   22
  The most important result is that accountability is important for students in the United 
States (and in a variety of other countries that are pushing for better performance measurement).  
Despite design flaws in the existing systems (Hanushek and Raymond (2003b)), we find that they 
have a positive impact on achievement.  This significantly positive effect of accountability holds 
across the alternative specifications of the basic achievement model.   
However, the impact holds just for states attaching consequences to performance.  States 
that simply provide better information through report cards without attaching consequences to 
performance do not get significantly larger impacts over no accountability.  Thus, the NCLB 
move toward adding consequences to accountability systems is supported by looking at the 
historic introduction of consequential accountability systems. 
  It is useful to put the detailed subgroup impacts into perspective.  Accountability 
significantly increases state achievement gains, particularly for Hispanics.  However, because 
both blacks and Hispanics generally show lower gains relative to whites on each of the tests, 
accountability by itself is insufficient to close the gap in learning.   
  We also find that the effect varies by subgroup, with Hispanics gaining most and blacks 
gaining least.  Because whites gain more than blacks after accountability is introduced, the racial 
achievement gap actually widens with the introduction of accountability.   
  In addition to accountability, the analysis looks into other determinants of student 
performance.  Most relevant for consideration of where we stand fifty years after Brown v. Board 
of Education, black students are hurt by greater minority concentration in the schools.  This 
compositional effect has no significant influence on white or Hispanic scores, making the effects 
very similar to those found in Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002).   
  These findings, taken together, underscore the fact that there is no one answer that will 
lead to all of the improvements that we desire.  The introduction of consequential accountability 
systems has a clearly beneficial impact on overall performance.  But other forces are 
simultaneously pushing the distribution of performance – particularly as observed in the black-  23
white achievement gap – in less desirable ways.  First, accountability as seen during the 1990s 
tended to help white achievement more than black achievement.  Second, the observed movement 
toward higher minority concentrations in schools has a detrimental effect on black achievement, 
again pushing toward a wider distribution of achievement. 
The finding of differential effects of accountability raises a clear policy dilemma.  A 
prime reason for the U.S. federal government to require each state to develop a test based 
accountability system involved raising the achievement of all students, particularly those at the 
bottom.  It has done that, but not at the same rate across groups.  We conclude from this that 
additional policies are needed to deal with the multiple objectives.  Again, as is frequently the 
case, a single policy cannot effectively work for two different objectives – raising overall student 
performance and providing more equal outcomes across groups.   
The movement toward stronger accountability in schools has also suggested to many that 
there would be adverse consequences – more exclusions, higher dropout rates, a narrowing of the 
curriculum, and the like.  While some existing research supports these presumptions, we conclude 
that the negative impacts are likely to be considerably overstated (Hanushek and Raymond 
(2003b)).  Importantly, many of the adverse effects that involve “gaming” the system come from 
short run incentives that are unlikely to be strongly present over time.  Moreover, our own 
analysis of special education placement rates indicates clearly that accountability has not had an 
overall impact through this form of exclusions.   
Finally, while we have not dwelled on it, the pattern of currently available accountability 
systems is not particularly strong.  A majority of the systems concentrates on overall achievement 
levels (with highly variable passing scores across states).  Such systems do not generally provide 
clear signals about the value-added of schools.  Instead they combine a variety of effects 
including those resulting from family background differences and neighborhood effects.  As such, 
they cannot provide truly clear and strong incentives.  Yet, in the face of the rather blunt 
incentives from existing systems, the introduction of an accountability systems leads to   24
achievement improvements on the order of 0.2 standard deviations.  Such improvements, while 
not revolutionary, are notable when compared to the failure to find alternative reforms that yield 
such impacts on a broad and sustained basis.  As accountability systems evolve, they are likely to 
have considerably stronger impacts if they can be moved in the direction of more precise 
incentives for individual schools. 
  
 
Appendix Table A1.  Number of states for analysis by race/ethnicity, 
test, and sample period 
 
  White Black  Hispanic  Total 
Mathematics      
1992-1996 35  29  32  96 
1996-2000 34  26  32  92 
Reading      
1994-19998 32  27  16  75 
1998-2002 34  29  22  85 
Total  135 111 102 348 
  
 
Appendix Table A2. Variable Definitions and Sample Descriptive Statistics: Means and Standard 
Deviations (in Parentheses) by Race/ethnic Group 
   All  White  Hispanic  Black 
0.39 0.38 0.35 0.44  Consequential 
Accountability  
Proportion of period with school accountability system  
having consequences for the school; Fletcher and 
Raymond (2002)  
(0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) 
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14  Report card system  
 
 
Proportion of period with report card system; Fletcher and 
Raymond (2002)  (0.31)  (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
   0.37  0.4  Disaggregated  
 
 
Proportion of period with school accountability system 
disaggregated by race/ethnic subgroups       (0.43)  (0.45) 




% of population age 25 and older with a high school 
degree or greater; interpolation for period of decennial 
census data by race/ethnicity between 1990 and 2000 
(11.8)  (5.1) (8.3) (7.3) 
6109 6005 6202 6149  School spending, $/ADM  Average expenditure per pupil in average daily 
membership for growth period (2000 $)  (1354)  (1273)  (1431)  (1383) 
-0.16 -0.17 -0.25 -0.11  Change in exclusion rates  
 
NAEP exclusion rates: difference in 8
th grade and 4
th 
grade lagged four years by test  (2.9)  (2.8)  (2.9)  (3.0) 
Minority exposure   0.38  0.16  0.45  0.57 
 
Average exposure rate to minorities (black + Hispanic) by 
school averaged across growth period years  (0.24)  (0.17)  (0.21)  (0.17) 
NAEP8  Average scale score, NAEP 8
th grade test  257.4  274.8  249.0  244.0 
    (16.2)  (8.5) (9.6) (6.4) 
NAEP4  Average scale score, NAEP 4
th grade test  207.6  224.7  200.4  193.5 
    (16.0) (6.2) (10.5) (7.3) 
State placement rate for special education  (percent)  12.63      Special education    
placement  rate    (2.0)     
0.493      Accountability (report        
card or consequence) 
=1 if either consequential or report card system in place; 
=0  otherwise  (0.5)     
Time in place  Years since introduction of accountability  system  1.046     
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